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THE DIALECTIC IN ACTION--VICISSITUDES IN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT IN CHINA

H. F. Schurmann

FOR YEARS JOKES ABOUT the dialectic have been manufactured in and outside the Communist camp. The general tone of these jokes has been that everything is its opposite at every moment. Most of these jokes probably had their origins in the terrible days of the Russian purges of the mid-1930's when a "friend of the people" became a "mortal enemy of the people" overnight, or rather his true nature was "unmasked." If the reception which these jokes received in the West mirrored the horror that Stalin's principled inhumanity aroused, the fact that so many originated in the Soviet Union revealed the contempt into which dia-mat had fallen among the Soviet people. Since the death of Stalin, despite continuing official sanction for the philosophy of dialectical materialism,[1] it is rather the "materialism" than the "dialectic" that is emphasized--more and more concern with techniques and technology.[2] When reading the speeches of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, one senses a strong practical strain, arising from what is perhaps the greatest obsession of the Soviet leaders at the present time: overtaking the United States economically and technologically. Little is evident of a dialectical mode of thinking, except for a few stock phrases about the contradictions of communism and capitalism.

If one blithely assumes from the Soviet case that all the talking about the dialectic in China, all the hundreds and thousands of articles in Chinese publications discussing and using "dialectical materialism" (piencheng weiwulun), is simply propagandistic nonsense, then one has shut one's mind to a main approach toward understanding Communist China. It is not just that the Chinese Communists keep on discussing the Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. It is rather that they think in terms of a dialectic of changing opposites in regard to a whole range of subjects: the situation in agriculture, the nature of organization, "the paradoxes of acting," the world situation, the development of history, human psychology. The writings and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese Communist leaders are replete with dualities of one sort or another. "Walking on two legs" is one of Mao Tse-tung's most famous dualities. Another, less well publicized, is: "concentrate the great authority, diffuse the small authority." Another is: "agriculture is the base, industry is the leader."

But one might say: is this not simply old-fashioned "yin-yang thinking"? The Hegelian-Marxian dialectic demands the creative

resolution of opposites. So, in addition to the dualities, we also have slogans that indicate resolution of contradictions, as, for example, Mao Tse-tung's slogan: solidarity--struggle--solidarity. All resolutions leading to solidarity must proceed through an anterior phase of struggle. This slogan is considered particularly important in "discussion" (t'aolun) of complex problems, where diverse opinions are actively solicited so that a true resolution of opposites can take place.

This is not the place to go into an intellectual history of the Chinese Communist dialectic. Let me say that it is highly unlikely that the leaders of Chinese Communism were converted to the dialectic simply by reading Hegel or the early Marx. Though this mode of thinking has its roots in true intellectual convictions on Marxism and in certain traditional Chinese modes of thinking in terms of polar dualities, it became manifest and operative in the course of practical experiences. These were, in my opinion, the experiences of building monolithic yet flexible organizational structures during the Yenan and Civil War periods.

One of the dialectical dualities the Chinese Communists are fond of is that of principle and reality, or theory and practice. Every experience in reality must be raised to the level of principle (particulars to universals), and all principles must find concrete expressions in reality (universals to particulars). Being Leninists but also practical men at the same time, the men of Yenan found this particular bit of the dialectic most useful. One of the most important organizational problems they constantly faced in the Yenan period was that of simultaneously having rigidity in principle but flexibility in practice. Or, in more concrete terms, to maintain a unified structure of party and army constantly responsive to the center and unquestionably ready to execute instructions from above, yet at the same time to have thousands of small guerrilla teams and party cells able and willing to act on their own, often without central commands, to attain specific, local objectives. Or--to put it along the lines of Mao's slogan mentioned above--to establish total monolithic authority culminating in the center, but at the same time to allow considerable autonomy for action at the lowest levels of organization.

The organizational structure that emerged from the Yenan period was one in which rigidity and flexibility, authority and autonomy, were built into the system. This system became the basis of the structure of society which the Chinese Communists created after their seizure of power.[3] Today we see in Communist China a system with an authoritarianism, a concentration of power, perhaps more absolute than that which existed in Russia. Nowhere in the vast expanses of mainland China does the powerful arm of the Party not extend and control. The men of Peking rule freely where emperors and republican presidents earlier had to make compromises with local power-holders. Yet, at the same time, this system has developed a flexibility which has permitted a series of

far-reaching and sudden shifts in basic policy, not once or twice, but many times during the short history of Communist China.

We in the West have become accustomed to thinking of Communist states as monolithic giants in which all movement of the limbs is governed by a manipulator in the center. The price of Communist totalitarianism, we have been told, is stifling of initiative, rigidity, a fear to move without a sign from the center. Researches into industrial management in the Soviet Union have shown that, even under Stalin, this was not the case, although the sources of initiative are far different from those of a free society. In China, system flexibility is, in my opinion, even more operative than that which existed in Russia under Stalin.

In the following pages I shall briefly discuss the vicissitudes in one area of organization in China.[4] Let me say here that we must not assume that the Chinese Communists have created a deus ex machina in which everything works as if by magic. Nor must we assume the opposite, that "system" is but camouflage for ad hoc operations. They have created a system that is perfectly understandable to us, and accessible to analysis. It has its great weaknesses and has had its failures. In fact, a sudden shift from flexibility to rigidity or vice-versa is almost always a sign of one or another failure. Yet it is important to understand that this is their organizational weapon, the one they intend to keep using. And here again, it is not just blind commitment to the system, but a definite confidence in its success and workability. However we judge Communist China and whatever attitudes to it we take, we must understand their organizational weapon.

IN A COUNTRY fully committed to complete industrialization as China is, the problem of industrial management assumes great importance. How is industry to be organized, directed, controlled? How are decisions to be made? The problem has been one of continuous concern to the Chinese Communists since the completion of their occupation of China. In many ways the changes that the systems of industrial management have undergone reflect processes and changes which have occurred in the country as a whole. At the present time, some new changes seem to be beginning, and the picture which seemed so clear and definite only a few months ago is no longer the same.

At the time of the "Liberation," industrial production was at a standstill. The main industrial centers in Manchuria had been despoiled by the Soviets during their occupation. The Nationalists in leaving were determined to cripple industry to whatever extent they were able. Since the Chinese Communist Party was still weak in the cities and among the workers, it was the army which initially stepped in and started the factories going again. Workers were re-assembled. Tools and machines which had escaped the ravages of war were brought forth once again. Old managerial personnel returned to the factories, and new technicians were recruited from

other parts of China to fill needed positions. Management was carried out by so-called "factory management committees" (kungch'ang kuanli weiyüanhui). Military men, top party members, leading technicians and engineers, some skilled workers, and of course top managerial people were members of the committee. It was usually headed by the factory director. As an essentially "non-party" organization, it was under the direct jurisdiction of the newly created state ministries. Since the regional administrative districts were still in operation at that time, they were responsible to the regional offices of the state apparatus.[5]

The period of industrial reconstruction lasted till 1952, and the first five-year plan began in 1953. However, long before the beginning of the first five-year plan, complaints began to be voiced about the clumsiness of the factory-committee system of management. As in Russia during the 1920's, "collegial management" was slow and inefficient. Already in 1948, the newspapers of Manchuria began to demand the introduction of a "system of responsibility" into industry. Workers would not take responsibility for the machines they worked with, and managers shrugged off responsibility on the grounds that the group, not the individual, was responsible. A system of individual responsibility must be introduced, the newspapers demanded. This was the system operative in the Soviet Union, and "advanced Soviet experiences" should be introduced into China. Significantly one of the first areas into which "responsibility" was introduced was that of the railroads.

In the late 1920's it had also been the railroad system into which the principle of individual responsibility was first introduced in the Soviet Union--on direct urging from Stalin. And, of course, one must remember that Soviet personnel operated the Manchurian railroads when the Chinese Communists took over. The demands for the introduction of a "system of responsibility," and moreover of Soviet managerial methods as a whole, were repeatedly voiced by Kao Kang, then "boss" of Manchuria. As in Russia, the demand for greater responsibility in industry was accompanied by thinly veiled pressure to reduce open party interference in managerial functions. The party must not replace management, warned Kao Kang.[6]

With the first five-year plan, the tendency to introduce Soviet methods of industrial management became stronger. The first Chinese five-year plan was closely modelled on those of the Soviet Union. Detailed targets were set, decision-making was centralized, and all operations placed under the tight control of the center. If the plan was to be Soviet style, then industrial management too must follow Soviet patterns. In the previous few years, further changes had gone on in the system of management. As the military element receded from the factories, and the party committees saw themselves more and more confined to ideological and political work, management acquired increasing scope for action. However, it was not the factory directors, but the so-called

"functional staffs"--staffs in charge of planning, technology, labor allocation, finances etc.--who in practice planned and directed production. The dispersal of authority at the top made co-ordination increasingly difficult. If management by factory committees had proven "erroneous," so too "functional management." How to concentrate authority yet assure competence--this was the question. The problem could be solved, it was felt, by introducing in its entirety the Soviet system of industrial management.

On the insistence of Kao Kang and the many Soviet advisers in Manchuria, it was decided to introduce two new systems: the production-sector management system, and the single-director system. Factories had already, for the most part, been organized along "functional lines," but henceforth all factories were to be subdivided into specific production sectors, ranging from the smallest nuclear "work sections" (kungtuan) through the shops (ch'echien) and factories (kungch'ang) to the enterprise itself (ch'iyeh). Each production sector was to have its permanently assigned working groups; no longer were production teams to be shifted from place to place as before. The tasks of each worker in each production sector were to be minutely and carefully defined. Rationalization of work organization demanded specificity of work tasks. The second system concerned authority. Henceforth, all decision-making authority was to be placed in the hands of unit chiefs, ranging from the work foremen (kungchang) to the factory directors (ch'angchang). These "single directors" (ichang) acquired quasi-dictatorial powers over the units they controlled. They were given considerable leeway in making "adjustive decisions." The new system had been developing in Manchuria since the early years after the "Liberation." But it was toward the end of 1953 that it began to be introduced in full force.[7]

Although the single-director system aimed at rationalization and regularization of work organization, it produced considerable internal discontent. For one thing, it relegated the functions of the party committees to "control" and "supervision" even more than before. It was the factory director, not the factory party secretary, who became the supreme figure in the production unit. This diminishing of party authority at a time when elsewhere in China the party had been building up its organizations as leaders in China's social and economic revolution was not completely welcomed. Furthermore, the appearance of a technocratic group in Manchuria directly increased the power of Kao Kang, who seems to have been Stalin's weapon for gaining an organizational foothold in the state apparatus of Communist China and in the Chinese Communist Party itself.

Thus, strange as it may seem, precisely at the time when the single-director system was being pushed through in its full form, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party launched a counter-attack. The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1954 called for a renewed emphasis on the authority of

the factory committees. Collective leadership through the party committees must be practiced, demanded the communique of the plenary meeting. In March 1955 a special enlarged meeting of the Central Committee announced the elimination of the Kao Kang-Jao Shushih group and the setting up of special party control commissions. From that time onward, little more was heard of the single-director system, save in a negative way. With the decline of Kao Kang's power during 1954, the regional branches of the state apparatus disappeared and a new centralization of power ensued. And with the Kao group also disappeared the system of one-man management, as the Soviets call it.

Aside from its intra-party implications, the single-director system--a direct copy from the Soviet Union--created an organizational system at variance with that which the Chinese Communists had built up since Yenan days. Instead of collective leadership by party committees at the top of a production unit, single technocratic managers, more or less free from party control, made the crucial decisions. Instead of team-like flexibility at the bottom, there arose a bureaucratic rigidity which rigorously defined each man's tasks. Not only from party circles, but from workers and lower-level managerial circles, complaints were voiced at the "arrogant" and "dictatorial" behavior of the single directors. The system further threatened the creation of a dualism of state and party which was the more dangerous because of the Stalinist intrigues behind the developments in Manchuria.

At the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, the demise of the single-director system was officially announced. A new system of industrial management was to be introduced called: factory director responsibility under the collective leadership of the party committee. Though the factory director's responsibilities remained as "individual" as before, he was shorn of his broad powers of decision-making. Henceforth, all major decisions relating to production were to be made by the party committee. Now the most important man in the factory was no longer the factory director, but the party secretary.[8]

Again one must ask: aside from the political implications of the single-director system, what was wrong with it? In his discussion of the five-year plan at the Eighth Party Congress, Li Fu-ch'un announced that henceforth the detailed over-centralized planning of the previous years would be modified in favor of more leeway for adjustment at lower levels and more emphasis on short-term planning and periodic plan revisions. "We must overcome the error of watching everything too closely and too tightly," he said.[9] In other words, excessive centralization had stifled "spontaneity" and "creativity" at lower levels. In an economy as backward as that of China, there had to be room for constant adjustment, and scope for decision-making at lower levels. All could not be decided in detail in Peking. But if the scope of autonomy at the lower levels was to be increased, such autonomy could not be granted

the dubious group of rising technocrats. The new powers had to be put into the hands of the most trusted and reliable organizational instrument--the party. When quotas, targets, plans, finances were to be discussed at the factory level, then these discussions must take place in the context of the party committee, and the final decisions must be those of the party.

WITH THE Eighth Party Congress, the organizational struggles and experiments reached a point of culmination and resolution. A new unity was signalized. Dissident elements in the party had been eliminated. The threatening dualism of party and state had ended, and the supreme power of the party was assured. Henceforth the party was to wield monolithic, centralized power--to be shared with no other organized group. Yet at the same time a new scope for action, a new autonomy in decision-making, was opened up at the lower levels of the apparatus. Activists were to be encouraged to forge ahead on their own to raise and again raise production. If the party was granted this new freedom for action, it also had the responsibility of assuring maximization of effort and correctness of actions.

After the Eighth Party Congress, there began an organizational process which reached its high point in the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The party's monolithic and collective power and authority became total. But, on the other hand, more and more were cadres sent down to the front lines of production--the so-called hsiafang movements. The Eighth Party Congress called for a renewed emphasis on the "mass line." What this meant in practice was an emphasis on the importance of the work team, on personal leadership of work teams by dedicated cadres. Office work was decried as bureaucratism. Cadres must get out to the masses and personally lead them toward greater achievements in production. Many industrial leaders were apparently discouraged by the readiness of the party to plunge ahead without rational planning and direction. These voices of protest were silenced. Mass action reached its highest point of intensity with the delirium induced by the formation of the communes. Daily mass movements aimed at eliciting collective behavioral responses from workers, and at producing the enthusiasm for "attacking production." "Regularization" of production was decried by the Mayor of Shanghai, K'o Ch'ing-shih, as bourgeois and reactionary. Late in 1959, the proponents of "regularization" were darkly accused of "rightist tendencies," and urged to mend their ways. More and more were analogies with the guerrilla period suggested. The work teams were supposed to act like guerrilla teams attacking objectives. In such a situation, leadership must be direct and personal, not abstract and bureaucratic emanating through written orders. Although the frenzy of excitement subsided after 1958, the "mass line" in work and management remained. At the top, the party committees met regularly to make the crucial "policy" decisions. At the bottom, hundreds of cadre-led teams stormed production targets.[10]

Under the new system of industrial management, the factory party committees acquired far-reaching powers. At the top level of a production unit, "the great authority" was indeed concentrated:

> In general, all problems which concern production planning in the enterprise, all important economic and technological measures for carrying out the state plan, all problems concerning the welfare of the broad masses of the workers, all problems concerning directives from higher echelons, as well as procedure and policy, the work arrangements for a given time period, problems of cadre policy, appointment, transfer, rewarding-and-punishing of cadres—all these problems must undergo collective discussion and decision by the party committee. When the party organization discusses these problems, it should proceed from basic policy and principle, and study key questions in the fulfilling of the state plan and in improving the work of plant management, as well as procedures, approaches, and methods for resolving these problems. It must produce proper decisions which bring together concrete conditions in the plant at that time, but must not involve itself in petty problems, allowing management leadership to decide on problems with daring resolve and rapid decisiveness. Furthermore, the party organization can concentrate forces to study many economic problems, discover production bottlenecks, and carry out well the party's political and ideological work.[11]

But if the "great authority" was now effectively concentrated at the top in the hands of the members of the party committee, at lower levels the "small authority" was to be diffused through scores of work teams, each "attacking" production. The core of these work teams were the party small groups, the smallest unit of party organization. The excerpts below from a recent article in the People's Daily, entitled "On Fully Developing the Militant Functions of the Party Small Group," throw light on the tasks of the work groups.

> In the struggle for production increase and economy centered on grain and steel, the Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the Shihchingshan Steel Company has greatly strengthened its leadership over production teams. While going deep to impel the workers to take part in management, it also has decisively strengthened the work of the party small group; it has made the party small group, under the leadership of the party branch, fully develop its militant functions. Each production team, with a party small group as its nucleus, forms a dynamic and powerful organization in the fight for production in the enterprise, and also a basic camp for carrying out ideological and political work vis-à-vis the masses. . . .
>
> This year, during June and July, the Shihchingshan Steel Company party committee assigned downward (ch'outiao hsiafang) more than 1,400 cadres to the front line of production. Taking the production teams as their base, they took charge of shift and team management, and carried out "red flag" competitions. [There

are] in the entire company more than 1,800 production teams. . . .

Recently the company party committee discovered a model advanced party small group in the basic construction work site--the "steel attack brigade" party small group. This party small group has four party members. The head of the party small group, Chao En-jung, is also the head of the production brigade. They work in a cement production brigade of 16 men. For years now, the party small group has led the workers of the brigade month after month in surpassing their production plans. This year they finished this year's work in 156 days.

This party small group under the leadership of the party branch is fully concerned with the ideological attitudes, production, living conditions, and study of the brigade. They firmly let "politics take command." Everyone takes a hand in making ideological and political work more profound, timely and regular, so that the members of the brigade constantly maintain full political fervor. They constantly analyze key production bottlenecks, impelling the masses promptly to resolve production problems. . . .

In the process of completing tasks, the party small group always and promptly grasps the production problems which arise, holds "battleground meetings" and, as time and place demand, resolves them.[12]

This is the situation that prevailed in industry until a few months ago. Management staffs had been depleted and cadres assigned to the work teams to carry out direct leadership. On the other hand, in the implementation of the "mass line," workers were assigned to do part-time managerial tasks. The Shihchingshan Company alone selected more than 14,000 workers to participate in managerial tasks concerning planning, technology, equipment, quality control, accounting, safety, work organization, etc. How effective such direct management by the workers has been is doubtful. Late in 1959 there was considerable protest from industrial leaders that constant mass movements were proving harmful to industrial operations. However, the anti-rightist-tendencies campaign launched by the Eighth Plenum in September 1959 made it clear that such criticisms were not appreciated. Mass movements, indeed, aroused "hot emotion" (jech'ing) in the workers to break targets, set them up again, and break them again. The mass movements, personal leadership of work teams, and group competition seemed to be the real key to achieving industrial breakthrough. Rationalization and regularization of work processes, normal managerial operations, were branded as reactionary and bourgeois. Even planning seemed to have something conservative and bureaucratic about it. Leap forward--this was the great slogan.[13]

YET NOW within the last few months a sudden change has come about. Again the pendulum of the dialectic has swung. Earlier, during the period of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese had openly

expounded the successes of their mass movements. Liu Shao-ch'i, in an article in the World Marxist Review, had sharply rejected criticisms, originating in the communist camp, which were skeptical about the recklessness of the mass movements and the great leap forward. But then came the Moscow meeting of the world's communist parties, a meeting in which the Chinese Communists expounded their organizational policies with great vigor. And shortly thereafter, in January 1961, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Ninth Plenum, in which it was announced that the pace of industrial development would be cut back and all efforts put into achieving a great harvest during 1961.

Bit by bit the signs of a change have been appearing. In agriculture, a pragmatic course has been urged. The peasants must be consulted on setting up production plans. Small gardens may again be tended by the peasants, the produce of which they may sell for their own profit. Not the unwieldy commune but the production brigade is to become the true nucleus of rural social organization. Whereas the commune was often identical with the hsiang, an artificial administrative entity consisting of several "natural villages," as Liu Shao-ch'i once described them, the production brigade for all practical purposes is identical with the "natural village." A Red Flag editorial recently called for a revival of the "hundred flowers and hundred schools" spirit: one must investigate concrete conditions, and in the process different opinions must be discussed. Other articles appeared urging party members to value the support of non-party cadres, since they too have an important role to play in society. A great campaign has been launched to improve statistical and information-gathering services. Daily radio broadcasts lecture commune cadres on proper procedures for "investigating concrete conditions." Mass movements are no longer spoken of in the frenzied terms of previous years.

This great swing of the dialectical pendulum could not fail to influence industry too, even though industry is one of the sectors of the economy where the Chinese have scored impressive successes. Not only was capital allocation to be cut, but rigid economy measures were to be introduced. Mechanization and automation were to be emphasized. Softly worded instructions began to appear urging regularization and rationalization. What only a short time before was bourgeois and conservative has now become the new slogan, modestly uttered.

Announced initially in the communique of the Ninth Plenum, the new industrial policy was made clear in a Red Flag article by Po I-po. First he reviewed the great successes which industrial development had scored in the previous years. However, the industrial development of those years had taken place "on a comparatively weak basis." Therefore, during the coming three years, primary emphasis must be put on quality and diversity of products. There

must be more emphasis on "balanced work" (p'ingheng kungtso). Economy means that industry must operate with the labor force it has now. Rationalization, mechanization, and automation mean that more reliance must be put on techniques and technicians.

In order to economize on raw materials, supplies, and fuel consumption, in order to reduce production costs, all enterprises must strengthen quota management, must improve economic accounting. Without quotas, accounting is impossible, and without accounting there is no way to check on economic efficiency, and it is impossible to push the backward to catch up to the advanced. One must instruct workers to break through original quotas, to create new ones, but this definitely does not mean that one does not need quotas. On the contrary, it means that one must do the work of quota management even better. One should encourage workers to do economic accounting work, but this definitely does not mean that we do not need the economic accounting work of specialists. . . .

We must constantly strengthen industrial management. With the accumulated experiences of the last ten years, especially the accumulated experiences of the great leap forward of the last three years, we have already evolved a system of industrial management suitable to the conditions of our country. That is one which tightly combines centralized leadership with large-scale mass movements, which tightly combines leadership by the party committee with the factory director assuming full responsibility, which tightly combines the principle of emphasizing political and ideological education and carrying through [the principle of] rewards according to work done, which tightly combines political work and economic work. The problem now is further to systematize and universalize these principles and methods. To raise the level of industrial management, we must rigorously maintain all rational systems of order, especially concerning production and technology, such as rules of operation, inspection, safety, etc. . . .

If we simply pay attention to current production and disregard future production, if we excessively consume stocks and materials, if we excessively wear out tools and equipment, if we needlessly squander labor, then future production cannot proceed in an orderly way (chengch'ang chinhsing). . . . If one sector, one unit, departs from the national plan, departs from the needs of the whole, unilaterally develops its own so-called "creativity," then that not only does not benefit the totality, but it also will not benefit that sector.[14]

How remarkable these words of Po I-po sound! How in contrast to those of Liu Shao-ch'i uttered only a short while before!

It goes without saying that we must do a good job of economic planning to enable, as far as possible, the various branches of the national economy to spurt ahead in harmony. We want both high speed and over-all balance. This is not easy to achieve;

> in high-speed development, it is more likely that certain imbalances will occur. We should not, however, give way to "fear of the wolf in front and of the tiger behind," vainly hoping for a haven of peace by adopting the method of reducing speed unjustifiably to achieve a balance.[15]

Despite the contrasts, one must note that the dialectical whole, so to speak, is the same for both Liu and Po. Last year, it was still "high speed" at the cost of "imbalance" that was emphasized. This year it is the other part of the dialectic that is beginning to be pushed: balance at the cost of high speed.

The signal from the Ninth Plenum and the admonitions of Po I-po were soon taken up. A few weeks later, in the People's Daily, an official article appeared calling for more stabilization, more rational work organization in industry. More emphasis was to be placed on responsibility. Earlier managerial staffs had been depleted to send cadres to the front line of production, personally to direct work groups. This had all been necessary in its time, but now it was bad, for "it resulted in destroying the system of responsibility in staff sections." "We must preserve both scientific management from the top down, as well as the spirit of production responsibility and initiative of the working masses." Orderly systems of work must be maintained. "The system of responsibility is indispensable for assuring regular production activities (chengch'ang ti shengch'an huotung)."[16]

SO THE pendulum has swung what seems to be a full 180°. It has swung not only in agriculture, in the cultural field, but also in industry. In agriculture, one can easily ascribe the swing to failures, and the sense of failure and the fear of future failure are expressed every day in the publications and broadcasts of the mainland. Daily radio broadcasts call upon the peasants to assure a "good crop year" (fengshou-nien). Yet the retreat from mass action to pragmatism has not been limited to agriculture. In industry one can hardly ascribe the shift to failure, for industry is the one field where success has been achieved. Or perhaps it is as Po I-po openly says: the successes have been in quantity rather than in quality. If mass action produced great leaps forward in quantity, then only careful, rational management can improve quality. Here the technician, not the party agitator, is the most important person. During the great leap forward, planning was more or less thrown to the winds as the production attack teams set and overfulfilled their own targets. Not only did planning break down in such a situation, but the economy ran away from its leaders. It was in some instances impossible to gather reliable data on economic performance. It is significant that great emphasis is now being placed on improving statistical work, on "investigation of concrete conditions."

The Western press has tended to see these developments as a manifestation of retreat. "The great leap backward" headlined one

report on the developments in agriculture. Certainly, looking at it from the knowledge we have of the N.E.P. period in Russia, it indeed seems to be "a step backward." Some other sources have seen in it an incipient breakdown of the whole system itself. In my opinion, the latter view is little more than wishful thinking. The striking thing is not just the swing, but its suddenness and audacity. Without tight, effective organizational control, such a swing on so broad a scale would have been impossible. The fact that the Chinese Communists have had the daring to allow such far-reaching modifications of their commune system, that they have brought back a policy of "regularization" which until a few months ago was derided as bourgeois and conservative, is a sign of their power rather than of their weakness. Without the power of total organization, such changes would have provoked upsurges of resentment and resistance.

De Tocqueville, in comparing pre-1789 France and Germany, noted ironically that revolution broke out precisely in France, where things were getting better, were changing, and that it was completely absent in Germany, which still lay dormant under a traditional system of control. Modern colonial countries have provided example after example of situations in which improvement has brought rebellion, but where rigid unchangingness has produced dormancy. Rebellions have arisen because improvement usually meant a lessening of control, both a lessening of formal political controls and traditional social control eroded by change. But in a communist society, the situation is different. There no change must be allowed to weaken the apparatus of manipulation and control. In Communist China today, the apparatus of organization is as strong as it ever was, if not stronger. Had the leaders not possessed the weapon of total organization and total control, it is unlikely that they would have risked such sudden and vast changes. The decision on the shift was made in Peking, but the audacity of the shift mirrors confidence in their ability to control and direct these changes.

Here we must return to the "dialectic." As Po I-po states, industrial management in China rests on a system which combines centralized leadership and large-scale mass movements. Translated into the terms of Chinese Communist ideological-sociological vocabulary, this means "centralism" and "democracy." Here it must be stated again that what the Chinese Communists mean by "democracy" is something quite different from what is understood in the West.[17] In an industrial context, "democracy" means mass action, work teams pressing forward under the impulses coming from personal leadership by cadres. Centralism means planning, definition and specificity of tasks and responsibility, "rationalization." It is significant that the Russians, who have always believed more in "centralism" than in "democracy," have consistently emphasized central planning and specificity of roles in industry, despite some recent trends toward decentralization. In China, during the period of the single-director system, the tendencies of "centralism"

dominated. With the Eighth Party Congress, the pendulum swung toward "democracy" and mass action. Now it would seem to be swinging back again toward "centralism."

But one may ask: is this not at variance with what one sees in agriculture? If the work team is being de-emphasized in favor of more rational and centralized management in industry, in agriculture it is the commune that is being de-emphasized in favor of the production brigades. Is it, then, that we have centralization in industry and decentralization in agriculture?

The question cannot be posed that simply. There is no doubt that today it is the commune organization that has been made "latent." It is the production brigades that are supposed to set their plans "in accordance with concrete conditions." But the commune has not disappeared. It remains an important administrative structure. It is the lowest level of the state apparatus--at the hsiang, or administrative village, level. Today commune-level cadres have been instructed to "investigate real conditions," to collect data, to perfect their statistical systems which broke down so drastically a few years back. Their tasks today are far less spectacular than they were in the heyday of the formation of the communes, when commune cadres sallied forth like little military commanders to whip up peasants and press them forward to superhuman production efforts.

It has always seemed to me that the formation of the communes involved elements both of centralization and of decentralization. At the commune or hsiang level an undoubted centralization occurred which put great power in the hands of the local cadres. The use and abuse of this power was mirrored in considerable peasant resentment. However, looking at the communes from the point of view of the society as a whole, commune-ization represented a move in the direction of decentralization. The Eighth Party Congress called for more decentralization, in part as a reaction against the period of excessive emulation of Soviet-style centralism. The formation of the communes in 1958 was in accordance with the spirit of the Eighth Party Congress, not in opposition to it. Commune cadres were given widespread powers to set their own targets and draw up their own plans. Being enthusiastic party members, they often set them at fantastic heights. Some publications spoke of the communes as "little nations." The decline in centralized control at the national level was mirrored in the breakdown of the statistical and reporting systems.

Now an opposite process is going on. While the production teams have been given leeway to carry on their production activities utilizing the advice of "old peasants," the commune apparatus is being quietly reorganized and strengthened. Already during the past two years there has taken place a gradual reimposition of effective control from the center. One of the first signs of this new centralization should be an improvement in the communications system--better reporting of economic data. The new communes may,

of course, never again have the appearance of the early communes of 1958. They may simply become a kind of state bureaucracy, the lowest echelon of a national ministry. But to speak of their "disappearance" seems to me to be wrong.

The organizational history of Communist China during the last decade has been one marked by considerable shifts and changes. As an example, we have briefly described the vicissitudes in industrial management. These shifts have always been motivated by real practical problems. The "dialectic" has not swung simply because of some "idea" in the minds of China's leaders. Yet these shifts and changes have been so daring and audacious that it could only have been either supreme recklessness or supreme confidence in organizational control that made them possible. That there was recklessness no one can deny. But the main thing, in my opinion, has been a confidence on the part of the leaders of Communist China in the organizational weapon they have created. It is an organizational weapon which has imbedded in it dualities of instruments, one to be used and the other "contradictory" instrument to be pulled out from reserve in case the first fails. The peculiar "dialectical" ideology of the Chinese Communists has given the leaders of Communist China a mode of thinking alien to that we know in the West, and perhaps alien even to the leaders of the Soviet Union. And the peculiar "dialectical" organization which the Chinese Communists have created is again something different from anything known in the West, and different enough from Soviet organization to have provoked considerable criticism during the recent Sino-Soviet dispute. It is an organizational system that seems to combine rigidity and flexibility at one and the same time.

NOTES

1. See Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii, Moscow, 1958.

2. The Soviet Twenty-first Party Congress called for increased emphasis on technical progress, mechanization, and automation. Since that time Soviet theoretical writing has taken a turn for the pragmatic. Even in writings on organizational problems, one sees the concern for techniques. E.g., Timofeesvskii and Beize, "Tekhnicheskii progress i kul'tura upravleniia," Kommunist 11, July 1960, pp. 49-56.

3. Here a problem arises which some day must receive full consideration. In the West, our traditions have led us to draw a sharp line between "society" and "government." As Reinhard Bendix says, "in our own day many sociologists and economists look upon formal legal and political institutions as the outward shell inside of which the 'real' social, economic, and psychological forces demand their primary attention." But in totalitarian societies, this distinction has been obliterated by "their coercive identification of all human concerns with the duties of citizenship." From "Max Weber's Image of Society" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 23, 29.

In a Communist society, particularly that of Communist China, all social and human relationships are made to fit into the system. System is supposed to be identical with society. Yet, even assuming the most extraordinary internalization of system values, no one can accept such an identification. But if it is absurd to suggest that system does equal society, it is equally absurd to suggest that "society" still slumbers beneath the fetters of the system, waiting only for "liberation" to resume its natural shape.

4. The subject of this article is dealt with more fully in another article "Organizational Contrasts between Communist China and the Soviet Union," to be published later this year.

5. See Li Li-san, Tsenyang kunali ch'iyeh, Hong Kong, 1949, pp. 23-25. Also Jenmin jihpao, February 6, 1950; July 8, 1956. Also Cheng Tsu-yuan, Anshan Steel Factory in Communist China, Hong Kong, 1955, pp. 25-38.

6. Jenmin jihpao, June 5, 1950. Kao Kang was chairman of the State Planning Commission.

7. Tientsin Takung-pao, May 13, 1954.

8. See Li Hsüeh-feng's report to the Eighth Party Congress, Jenmin shouts'e 1957, pp. 111-13.

9. Jenmin shouts'e 1957, p. 110. Li succeeded Kao Kang as chairman of the State Planning Commission.

10. Hungch'i 21, 1959, pp. 1-9.

11. Liaoning jihpao, April 24, 1957.

12. Jenmin jihpao, December 17, 1960.

13. Hungch'i 21, 1959, pp. 1-9.

14. Hungch'i 3-4, 1961, pp. 23-25. Po I-po is chairman of the National Economic Commission.

15. Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China," Peking, 1959, p. 31.

16. Jenmin jihpao, February 22, 1961.

17. See my article, "Organisational Principles of the Chinese Communists," China Quarterly, April-June 1960, pp. 47-58.

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MANPOWER UTILIZATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: JAPAN, MANCHURIA, TAIWAN

Irene B. Taeuber

THE HISTORIC EXPERIENCE, the conceptual framework, and the analytic techniques with which we assess the population prospects for China are Western. This is as true of Soviet developments and Marxist-Leninist ideologies as it is of United States developments or Malthusian-"explosion" models. It is obvious that the Chinese are neither Russians nor Americans, and that smoothly moving models of their possible behavior may have little relevance to their actual behavior. It is also obvious that historic recapitulations are unlikely. But population statistics, theoretical formulations, and analytic designs for China itself are limited. Even the implicit view that cultural and historical factors may alter demographic anticipations is an assumption.

There is limited escape from the absence of data in study of the records of three areas that approach historical experiments--the Japanese in Japan, and the Chinese in Manchuria, and in Taiwan. Japan has a Chinese-based culture, and she has made the transition to an urban, industrial population of low mortality and low fertility. The Manchurian Chinese were recent migrants or the descendants of such migrants from Hopei and Shantung, and Manchuria included diversified types of economic activities. The Chinese in Taiwan were stable and largely agrarian, and their ancestral affiliations were in Fukien and Kwangtung. What were the associations between manpower utilization and the transition to low fertility in Japan? Were there similar associations in Manchuria and Taiwan? What is the relevance of these historic interrelations to the future of the massive population of mainland China?

There are three guiding hypotheses as to the fertility of Chinese or Chinese-based populations, the nature of past demographic transitions, and the bases for future transitions. 1. The fertility of a Chinese or a Chinese-based population is high, and it is highly resistant to change. 2. The historic transitions from high to low fertility, whether in the West or in Japan, occurred slowly in association with economic transformation and social modernization. 3. The rapid reductions in mortality that are now occurring--or possible--preclude smooth demographic transitions through evolutionary changes in fertility. Phrased in positive terms, revolutionary changes in the relations of mortality to modernization require revolutionary changes in the relations of fertility to modernization.

Japan[1]

The modernization of the economy and of the population of Japan is a story that need not be retold here. There are mythologies about the past, though, and the swiftly changing dynamics of the present have out-paced generalization and have made theory approach lore. Hence we shall focus on the Tokugawa-Meiji transition and the altered pace of change between the century from 1850 to 1950 and the decade from 1950 to 1960.

In the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, the Japanese were as predominantly agricultural, as rural, as tradition bound, and as illiterate as the Chinese of 1650 or 1800 or 1950. A cursory survey of the official statistics, whether in their original or their reconstructed versions, shows initially low but slowly increasing birth and death rates. In accepted explanations, the low birth rate was associated with the practice of female infanticide, while the low death rate was natural in a simple agrarian life remote from great cities and intruded germs. In fact, detailed analyses for Japan and the regions of the country demonstrate that the pre-modern fertility and mortality of the Japanese were alike high. Sex-selective infanticide was not a major factor in the level of the birth rate or the age and sex structure of the population of Japan, either in the late Tokugawa or the early Meiji periods. It was a marginal rather than a modal practice. Since the hazards to life were so great, few families had the large numbers of living children that made infanticide a considered though partial solution to economic difficulties.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the demographic transition proceeded in Japan in a pattern almost classic in its regularities. The farming population remained relatively unchanging, since all the sons and daughters beyond those needed for replacement moved to non-agricultural occupations, primarily and increasingly in great cities. The proportion of men who labored in agriculture declined; the proportion of people who lived in cities increased. Age at marriage advanced, and fertility declined. Proportions of the male labor force in primary industry, proportions of the population living in cities, and total or marital fertility were so closely interrelated that any one could be estimated approximately from any other.

The decline in national fertility was due both to the declines in the fertility of the specific groups and to the changing balance of the components in the national population. Projections into the future seemed firmly based in demographic theory and empirical developments. Those projections that were made indicated continuing population growth as a major hazard throughout the third and into the fourth quarters of this century. Birth rates had been high initially, and they had been highly resistant to change. Declines had come slowly as by-products of the movements of productive manpower from agricultural occupations in rural areas to non-agricultural occupations in urban areas. The future, it was believed, would be a smooth evolution from the past.

In the postwar years, death rates dropped precipitantly as the Japanese secured the insecticides, the antibiotics, and the other medical and health advances that had been achieved elsewhere in their years of insulation. But soon birth rates dropped even more precipitantly than death rates. Today Japan is a country in more advanced demographic transition than the United States, with a death rate almost as low, a birth rate far lower.

Japan's experience was once cited as illustrative of the slowness of demographic transition in the familial societies of the East, where sons were of pre-eminent value, individualism limited, and the institutions and values sustaining fertility resistant to change. Today Japan's experience is cited as illustrative of swift demographic transition, without reference to the century of development that preceded the decline of fertility in the last decade. Swift changes in fertility occurred along with changing social institutions, widespread queries of values, a relaxed social structure, and a rapid rate of economic growth. The Japan that has achieved the low birth and death rates of the most advanced nations is a nation that can be classified appropriately only in this category.

Manchuria

The numerical demography of China is determined by the processes of growth and expansion, decline and contraction, among the hundreds of millions who live below the Great Wall. Here the population of traditional China and the demographic correlates of Han culture can best be studied. The demographic responses of Han people to economic developments that are industrial and market-oriented are manifest in Manchuria.

The exploration of the interrelations of manpower utilization and demographic transition in Manchuria involves three specific inquiries. First, what was the level of the fertility of the Han in the stable agricultural areas? Second, what were the interrelations among the altered manpower utilization of the great cities and the industrial areas, the migrant status of the population, and the levels of the fertility? Third, were these interrelations, if they existed, constant structural associations? Or were they indicative of a beginning transition toward lower fertility and a reduced potential for population growth? The initial summary is limited to the Japanese-dominated sector of the Liaotung Peninsula and the upward penetration of the railway zone, for it was here that industrial development and population statistics were concentrated.

Kwantung Leased Territory and SMR Zone[2]

The Chinese in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway Zone lived in a diversified microcosm within a developmental region. Here were rural areas where relatively stable Han populations labored in agriculture, apart from the commerce, the industries, and the expansionist activities of the Japanese except in so far as the great cities and the industrial areas provided

markets for their crops and employment for their sons. Here also were Dairen and Port Arthur, along with the central core of the great cities stretched along the railway lines.

The major generalization concerning the interrelations and changes in the demography of the Han over the 40 years from 1905 to 1945 is a bifocal one. The agrarian Chinese remained as traditionally Han as if they had continued to live in Hopei or Shantung. The urban Chinese were resident in cities for varying periods of time, but they were not full participants in economic development. The levels and the changes in fertility were those appropriate to the two situations. The fertility in the unmodified villages was not altered. The fertility in the cities and industrial areas was reduced substantially, but the reductions were products of economic pressures and structural imbalances. There was a reduced level of fertility, not a continuing downward movement. In 1930, the gross reproduction rates for the Han were 3.2 in the rural districts, 3.1 in the Kwantung Leased Territory as a whole. If the age and sex structures of the populations had been those inherent in the fertility and mortality of the period, the birth rates would have been 47 in the rural areas, 43 in the Territory as a whole. There is no evidence that rates had been higher in the past; there is no evidence that they were lower in later years.

Analyses for the great cities and the surrounding rural areas in Manchuria as a whole corroborate the deductions made on the basis of the data for the Kwantung Leased Territory and the SMR Zone. Hence the further analysis will concern the Han populations in the hsien (counties) and the banners (roughly equivalent to tribes) of Manchuria.

Hsien and Banners of Manchukuo[3]

The major experimental area for study of the levels, the variations, and the plasticities in the demographic behavior of large and diversified Han populations is Manchuria; the great body of data is the report on the Manchukuo census of 1940. The captive state had been established less than a decade. Family institutions and values would not have been modified appreciably during this brief period. Hence it may be presumed that the levels and interrelations of fertility outside the industrial areas of the South Manchuria Railway Zone and the great cities would be those of a Han population living in generally favorable economic and social conditions.

The geographic expansion of Chinese population and culture proceeded through outward expansion from the frontiers of existing settlements. However, the major economic and demographic developments were those involved in the further and more intensive utilization of the areas already occupied. Areas settled by migrants quickly developed native-born populations. Soon thereafter the maturing youth moved elsewhere to find jobs--and internal migrants

were added to or replaced the immigrants from Hopei and Shantung. In 1940 the agricultural areas of Manchuria had largely stable and non-migrant populations. Non-agricultural areas were still predominantly migrant.

The fertility of the Han women in the hsien and the banners of Manchuria was high. There were few relations that suggested either increase or decrease, whether in stable or in migrant areas. Movements to the hsien of Manchuria, residence within the hsien, movements to other hsien--these were changes in location, not changes in ways of living. There was an amelioration of poverty but not a reduction in the rate of human reproduction. Continuing economic developments were required if the poverty of Hopei and Shantung were not to spread throughout Manchuria.

Taiwan--and Summation[4]

The fertility of the Chinese population of Taiwan has always been high, and it has remained without substantial change in level from the Ch'ing Dynasty to the present. Mortality declined, slowly and irregularly at first, then slowly and persistently in an effective colonial order, finally precipitantly when modern means of disease control were introduced. The concurrence of unchanging birth rates and declining death rates resulted in a trebling of the population in 60 years.

The congruence of developments and interrelations in Taiwan with the theoretical anticipations is striking in its extent and its simplicity. It is appropriate, therefore, to restate the hypotheses as a basis for a comparative résumé and suggestions concerning relevance to the processes and prospects for population growth in China itself.

1. That the fertility of a Chinese or a Chinese-based population is high, and that it is highly resistant to change.

The gross reproduction rate of the Chinese population of Taiwan was 3.1 in 1941-42 and in 1955-57. The age and sex structures of the populations surveyed in the years from 1905 to 1956 are generally consistent with the stable populations that would be produced by this level of fertility and the age-specific mortality of the various periods. Moreover, this level of fertility that persisted in Taiwan is similar to the level among the Chinese in Manchuria. Hence preliminary explorations were made on the assumption that the level was a modal Chinese one, characteristic also of the great population of the mainland. It was further assumed on the basis of the evidence from Taiwan and several surveys of mainland populations that the expectation of life at birth in China in the decades prior to the 1950's was not higher than 25 years. This is the assumed mortality not of a specific year but of a period of years over which the age and sex structure of the existing populations had been molded.

The age and sex structure of the population with a gross reproduction rate of 3.1 and an expectation of life at birth of 25 years is quite consistent with that of the surveyed population of Taiwan in 1905, taking into account the demonstrable biases and deficiencies in the reported structure. It is similarly consistent with the age and sex structure of the small group of Chinese farmers surveyed in Fukien and Kwangtung in 1932.[5] The most intriguing and speculative of the comparisons is that with the age and sex structure of the mainland population as reported for 1953 and read from a published age pyramid.[6] The proportion below age 5 was quite consistent with the assumed fertility and mortality. The proportions aged 5 to 14 were consistent with the combined assumptions of under-reporting and excess deaths in infancy and childhood in the years of war and civil war. Sex ratios were similar to those in Taiwan in 1905, except that the evidences of prior practices of infanticide were less convincing. The major deviations of the reported structures from the stable model lay in the generally rectangular character of the distribution and the deficiencies in the proportions in the age group from 15 to 29, the surpluses thereafter. These same deficiencies were found in equally severe form in the populations surveyed in Taiwan in 1897 and 1900, and in slightly less severe form in the population surveyed in 1905. In these instances, analyses of internal relations and external associations in 1905, combined with the tracing of the age cohorts in later surveys, showed the early peculiarities to be products of biases in reporting and the linkage of reports to existing records.

The unexpected similarity of the reported 1953 age structure with the structures for Taiwan in the early years of this century is suggestive for further analysis. It is not a validation of the data in the age pyramid, nor is it sufficient evidence of the levels of fertility or mortality in traditional China.

2. That historic transitions from high to low fertility were products of economic transformations; that movement to low fertility would not be expected in the absence of such transformations.

In Japan, industrialization and urbanization were the dynamic processes, fertility levels and changes the associated variables. In neither Manchuria nor Taiwan did changes in manpower utilization within the stable culture lead to progressively declining fertility.

3. That revolutionary reductions in death rates bar slow demographic transitions in the future.

Japan's modernization occurred during a century in which levels of fertility and mortality were linked closely to economic development and social change. Population growth was never rapid; it reached two per cent a year only in the baby boom after the Pacific War. If the rate of population increase had been 3.0 or 3.5 per cent a year in the last decades of the nineteenth century,

economic and demographic developments could not have occurred as they did.

The fertility of the Chinese is high, and it has been highly resistant to change. Mortality is already reduced; given the economic base, it could be reduced much further. The coexistence of a birth rate of 45 to 47 per 1,000 total population and a death rate of 7 to 10 per 1,000 total population would yield an annual rate of natural increase of 3.5 to 4.0 per cent a year. The long continuation of a rate of increase such as this in a population approaching three-quarters of a billion people would pose difficulties even in the contemplation. Given the totality of the economic and demographic situation of China, the alternatives may well be either far quicker and more rapid declines in birth rates than any to be anticipated from historic experience or failure to secure and maintain low death rates.

NOTES

1. For a comprehensive analysis of the demographic transition in Japan, see Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan, Princeton, 1958. The bibliography includes citations to the censuses and vital statistics of Japan and each part of the Empire and Imperial area.

2. Based on the quinquennial censuses and the annual reports on the present resident population, migrations, and vital events, published by the government in Dairen. For specific citations, see reference in Note 1.

3. Manshukoku. Kokumu-in, somu-cho, rinji kokusei chosa jimu kyoku. Kotoku shichi'nen, rinji kokusei chosa hokoku. Chiho hen [Reports of the Special Census of 1940. Section of Provinces], Hsinking, 1941-43. 19 parts.

4. Analysis and citations to sources, "Population Growth in a Chinese Microcosm: Taiwan," Population Index, Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1961.

5. For the setting, the data, and general analysis, John Lossing Buck, Land Utilization in China, Chicago, 1937, especially Ch. V, "Population," by Frank W. Notestein and Chi-ming Chiao.

6. For analysis of the official statistics of the People's Republic of China, evaluation of the age data, alternative reconstructions, and citations to sources, U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Size, Composition, and Growth of the Population of Mainland China, by John S. Aird, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 14, (forthcoming).

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CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS IN INDONESIA

Guy J. Pauker

ON JULY 8, 1960, Harian Rakjat, the official organ of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Communist Party of Indonesia, published a long statement by the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee, entitled "Evaluation of the Work Cabinet After One Year Shows that the Cabinet Composition Does Not Guarantee the Implementation of the Three-Point Program--Therefore It Should Be Revamped." The PKI studiously refrained from attacking President Sukarno personally, but criticized more sharply than ever before the role of the Indonesian officer corps under the cabinet formed on July 9, 1959.

Referring to the military administrators of economic enterprises taken over from the Dutch since December 1957, the Politbureau statement claimed that

> the masses of the workers had hoped that they would be used to serve the people and improve the workers' living conditions. These hopes were not realized at all. The fact was that these enterprises were placed under the control of certain groups whose attitude toward the workers was even worse than those of foreign bosses. The influential elements of these groups formed among themselves a group of bourgeois which controlled and made use of the state apparatus to serve their economic interests. They also created among themselves bureaucratic capitalists who oppressed both the working class and the national bourgeoisie and proved themselves to be the medium which was creating conditions for the imperialists to continue their policy of exploitation and extortion.

By labeling the members of the officer corps "bureaucratic capitalists" and (elsewhere in the statement) "comprador elements," serving the interests of "the imperialists" and oppressing "the working class and the national bourgeoisie," the PKI was clearly telling all those familiar with communist terminology and doctrine that the Indonesian officers are "enemies of the people." The reasons for this were spelled out elsewhere in the Politbureau statement, in discussing the operations against right-wing rebel groups in West Java, the Celebes and Sumatra:

> The fundamental mistakes which brought about the stagnation of the security question were that officials responsible for security did not spend the greater part of their energy and thought on eliminating counter-revolutionary rebel cliques, but on preventing the development of revolutionary and democratic movements led by the Communist Party. And the struggle against the people

and the Communist Party was, as usual, regarded as the fundamental one.

Referring to martial law, which has been maintained in Indonesia since March 14, 1957, and has given the officer corps a legal framework for the establishment of its control over the country's public life, the Politbureau declared that

> the decree of a state of emergency was an effective weapon for comprador elements and bureaucratic capitalism to consolidate themselves economically, for they could make use of this decree to gag the mouths of the people, tie their hands and feet, and also suppress the activities of the press, so that people could not raise their voices and take action to oppose them. Therefore the question of lifting the state of emergency decree is the most pressing question in the development of Indonesia.

On July 19, 1960, the Djakarta military authorities summoned the members of the PKI's Politbureau to account for the statement, which, according to an Army spokesman, "had given rise to uneasiness and commotion in wide circles of society and might lessen the government's authority." Party Chairman D. N. Aidit and Politbureau member Njoto appeared before the military authorities three days later but were released, after signing a statement, so that they might attend a meeting of President Sukarno's Supreme Advisory Council, of which they are members. On the same day Politbureau member Sakirman, a member of President Sukarno's National Planning Council who had been arrested several days earlier by the military authorities, also was released. Djakarta's war administrator imposed a total ban on all PKI booklets and leaflets criticizing the government, and temporarily suspended the daily Harian Rakjat.

DO THESE events indicate that a showdown is approaching between the PKI and the National Army? Such a development appears unlikely at present. In an armed struggle with the Army, the PKI would be in danger of suffering a worse defeat than in either 1926, when the Dutch colonial authorities crushed a communist rebellion, or 1948 when the party was defeated by the Indonesian Army and several of its top leaders were executed. Furthermore, while communist advances in the governmental apparatus of Indonesia are substantial, the PKI does not seem to control strategic positions comparable to those the communists occupied in Eastern Europe prior to the coups of 1947-48.

It is more plausible to assume that the current attitude of the PKI toward the Indonesian Army is only another step in pursuit of bold and imaginative communist tactics peculiar to Indonesia. Conditions in Indonesia do not seem ripe for a communist coup, whereas the alternative tactics discussed below promise handsome results in the future.

The total socio-economic situation of the country is characterized by rapid population growth and constant economic deterioration. The development of productive forces, both in agriculture

and in industry, is insufficient to keep up with the rate of population growth. The structural deficiencies of the economy are enhanced by the disruption of its distributive mechanisms, as foreign capital and enterprise, both large-scale and small-scale, are eliminated by radical nationalism.

It is difficult to forecast when Indonesian society will reach the limits of its endurance. Knowledgeable Indonesian economists point out that during the Japanese occupation living conditions were harder than they are at present, and yet no large-scale revolt took place. The resilience or apathy of a peasant society has to be assessed by criteria different from those applicable to participants in a developed economy. But the compound effect of population growth and economic deterioration is bound eventually to become unbearable, at which point the country will be ready to turn in desperation to extremist groups.

The PKI is more likely to wait for that moment than to face annihilation in a showdown with the Indonesian Army today. This means, of course, that the PKI must protect its legal existence by a cautious domestic policy, and must avoid a break with President Sukarno. Soviet maneuvers can help the party by making the Indonesian cabinet so dependent on communist-bloc economic, military and diplomatic support that it dare not alienate Communist good will. That such a policy may be in line with Khrushchev's long-range thinking was suggested by his interview with Walter Lippmann in October 1958, from which the following passage is taken:

> His central thesis, then, is that the Soviet economy will in the near future surpass ours in productivity per capita, and that this achievement will cause the poor countries of the world to turn to the Soviet Union as an example and for material help. I asked Mr. K. whether he believed that the Soviet system could be made to work in truly backward countries since the system calls for a high degree of technological competence and also of administrative efficiency.
>
> He replied that forty years ago Russia was a very backward country, and look what Communism had already achieved. I said, yes, much had been achieved, but there had been great Russian scientists before the Revolution and Russia was not a backward country compared with many in Africa and with some in Asia.
>
> I did not feel that he was willing to face this somewhat speculative question, and he put an end to the discussion by insisting that Indonesia would do much better if it adopted the Soviet system. He went on to say that India could easily feed itself without limiting its population if it had the kind of government and the kind of economy which was capable of enterprises like converting the vast jungles of India into arable land.[1]

This does not appear to have been a casual statement. Khrushchev's words and deeds give the impression that he wants to create

in the world today the image of a mature communist system, experienced in government and in economic development. Violence, while not discarded on philosophical grounds, is no longer to be used as the primary tool of the revolution, except in self-defense against "reactionary forces." It is interesting to speculate about Khrushchev's present preference regarding the form of a communist takeover in such a country as Indonesia.

Immediately after World War II dire economic needs led the Soviet Union to exploit the East European satellites as if they were colonies, despite the considerable political difficulties this treatment created within the communist bloc. (These difficulties became publicly known at the time of the break with Tito.) Today in Southeast Asia the Soviet Union can obtain in trade whatever products might make the domination of a country like Indonesia seem economically attractive. Desirable as the acquisition of a tropical satellite may appear to Soviet economic planners, it can hardly be a major consideration in the global strategy of communism.

A few years ago the Soviet military may have been vitally interested in trying to pole-vault over peripheral countries allied with the Free World into the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Whether or not Khrushchev meant it when he stated that the Soviet Union needs no bases in Cuba, on the ground that the best place for its launching pads is at home, Indonesia is not likely to occupy a high position on a Soviet list of possible overseas bases. Smaller countries, easily amenable to techniques of indirect aggression and subversion, would be more tempting targets for Soviet planners, should they seek to set up a system of overseas points of support.

While it is possible that a communist revolution in Indonesia, if conditions were ripe for it, would be welcomed by the Soviet Union, and while it would certainly be supported by Communist China, the current situation in Djakarta and the general trend of recent events there suggest that the PKI and its Soviet backers may be thinking along other lines. They should have strong reasons to believe that the main value of a communist victory in Indonesia, from the point of view of the long-range, global objectives of communism, would be, not economic or strategic, but psychological. No other major country seems more suitable to demonstrate the potential mass appeal of communism and the possibility of achieving a "better future," not by the violence of activist minorities or by "revolutionary war" as in China, but peacefully in response to genuine popular demand. In a country that has been able to build up, in less than one decade, a Communist Party of 1.5 to 1.8 million members--the largest or second largest outside the communist bloc--and where it is possible for free elections to bring that party a plurality of the votes cast, communism would miss a real opportunity by turning to violence, except in self-defense. If Indonesia succumbed to communism peacefully, the "demonstration effect" in the rest of the world would be of incalculable value to

the Soviet Union, and the prestige accruing to communism would be immense.

Hence it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will continue to use its influence in Indonesia to protect the growth potential of the PKI, and will advise the leaders of the party to be cautious. Indeed, patience was the key word used by the Secretary-General of the PKI, D. N. Aidit, in a Pravda article of May 23, 1960, commemorating the fortieth anniversary of his party.

THERE ARE indications that a debate on tactics has been going on inside the Politbureau of the PKI since at least 1959, Aidit supporting the Russian policy of continued co-operation with President Sukarno, while Lukman urges abandonment of the "united front" policy in favor of a revolutionary forward movement.

If it is true that Khrushchev came to Indonesia in February 1960 at Aidit's specific request, in order to buy time for the PKI by offering Indonesia new economic credits of $250 million, as well as substantial military credits,[2] then it would seem that the Russian policy of patience is currently prevailing over the activist Chinese one. It is understandable that the PKI, knowing that it could not achieve much economically without external assistance, would want the full support of the Soviet Union. That country arouses no negative feelings in the Indonesian masses and has the resources to help, while Red China, toward which Indonesians feel hostile, is far less equipped to render assistance.

If my argument is correct, it becomes possible to interpret the present policy of the PKI in the following way. Having won more than 16% of the popular vote in September 1955, and having increased its electoral following in the local and regional elections in 1957 to more than 25%, the PKI seemed well on its way to confirming the thesis, expounded by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, that Communism can be established by parliamentary methods. The reaction of the officer corps and of various political forces in the country blocked this avenue to power, at least temporarily, when the general elections scheduled for September 1959 were postponed. After the establishment of an authoritarian regime backed by the military and by radical nationalists, the PKI could no longer hope to become a governing party through the parliamentary game. Yet it did not necessarily follow that a violent coup was the only alternative.

It can be argued that the PKI is now following a third way to power, building up its prestige as the only solid, purposeful, disciplined, well-organized, capable political force in the country, a force to which Indonesia will turn in despair when all other possible solutions have failed. In building up this image, it is important that the PKI demonstrate its power, skill, and influence at all levels of public life.

Doubtless the PKI knows as well as anybody else in Djakarta that the control of a large block of seats in the new, appointed

parliament, which was explicitly told by the President on June 25, 1960, that it should not make decisions by majority vote, does not have the same importance as in a normal parliament. But to show the country that the Communist Party has become so important that it has a larger representation than any other group helps to build up respect for the party. In Sukarno's policy-making bodies, such as the Supreme Advisory Council and the National Planning Council, the exact percentage of communist members may be equally unimportant, as policy disputes will not be solved by numerical strength, but it is useful to the PKI to have Politbureau members Aidit and Njoto in the Supreme Advisory Council, and to have Politbureau member Sakirman and an important member of the Central Committee, Wikana, on the National Planning Council. This representation shows the whole country the importance of the Party.

For the same reason, it is understandable that the PKI would like to see well-known, high-ranking party members in the Cabinet. Here, similarly, prestige is more important than the desire to occupy strategic positions in the security field, which the Army holds and is unlikely to yield. (The acquisition of such positions, of course, was a standard feature of the communist coups in Eastern Europe after World War II.) The same argument applies to the provincial and local government levels and to any other bodies through which the PKI can build up its image as a major party of government, to be eventually called to power, as it were, by acclamation.

To be sure, the presence of communists in the various organs of government has a protective purpose as well. The party is less likely to be hit by a sudden and unexpected move of its enemies if it is represented in all councils of government. To protect itself against destruction, the party may also deem it desirable to establish a Yenan-like redoubt in the "red triangle" of East Java, to try to infiltrate the armed forces, and to provide para-military drill for the village youth.

If one assumes that the road to power preferred by the PKI is neither a coup on the Czech pattern nor a military conquest as in China but a peaceful accession, it is useful to distinguish between the party's protective measures, which are likely to be primarily subversive, and its efforts to establish itself as the country's ultimate remedy against governmental impotence, efforts which are bound to be overt propaganda moves. The PKI is currently engaged in a massive, long-range operation to seduce the elite and the masses alike, and it wants to appear to them as a tower of strength amidst chaos. It therefore seems at least as important to assess the reaction of Indonesians to the presence and role of known communists in the major organs of government as it is to identify crypto-communists in various places. The number of the latter may be a useful index of the likelihood of a PKI coup, but a knowledge of the former should help to signal a developing "bandwagon effect" favoring the PKI. The tactics used in Eastern Europe after World War II are by no means the only conceivable ones.

In 1945 President Sukarno entertained the notion of a one-party system based on a "National Front" of which he would be the leader. This scheme was blocked by the political parties. In October 1956 he resumed the search for support in the creation of the system he favored. The conclusion was that a monolithic state apparatus was not feasible. "Guided democracy" was then devised either as an intermediary step or as the next best solution. In his actions against the political parties, Sukarno was supported by General Nasution and by other commanding officers hostile to politicians and to parliamentarianism.

The PKI has given support to Sukarno's "guided democracy" but has firmly opposed the abolition of political parties. The reasons are clear: in supporting the President, the communists safeguard their chances of ultimately taking over power in a legal way. But the take-over would be most valuable if the PKI came to power in its own right. If the party had to dissolve its legal organization and lose its political identity in a "National Front," then--although it would maintain its subversive organization and eventually could take over from within--the "demonstration effect" to the world at large would be lost. The change of government would appear as just another example of communist treachery and duplicity, something from which the new "respectable" communist seems to shy away. In the near future, therefore, the PKI may be expected to fight very hard and, at the same time, to be very flexible and patient in maintaining itself as a separate party.

The desire to maintain the unity and good name of the country --of which Sukarno is still the symbol--has paralyzed the anti-Communist maneuvers of the officer corps (with the exception of the small but important groups involved in the rebellions of the last four years). Also, the officer corps lacks self-confidence, owing to its weak educational background and meager practical experience. The Army's recent efforts in politics have not been very encouraging. The National Front for the Liberation of West Irian and the Co-operation Bodies, created in 1957-58, which linked the Army with various organized groups and provided a measure of control over the expanding influence of the PKI, were abolished in January 1961 and replaced by an organizationally distinct National Front, in which some political parties, including the PKI, and the military are associated.

It must have been a bitter lesson for the Army that the General Staff accomplished little in March 1960 by encouraging the opposition parties to form a Democratic League. Perhaps the officers were hoping that under their protection the dissatisfied political parties, rallying under the banner of the Democratic League, would vigorously challenge the PKI and the other groups supporting Sukarno, thus creating a crisis situation which could be made to justify a military coup in the interest of stability. The Democratic League did not show much aggressiveness, fizzled, and was banned by President Sukarno a year later.

It seems increasingly probable that the Indonesian officer corps is likely to act decisively only if the situation gives them no choice. The PKI is studiously avoiding giving them an opportunity, warning its cadres repeatedly against becoming the victims of "provocation."

IF THE present situation, as currently manipulated by President Sukarno, continues for even a few years, the officer corps will have become increasingly corrupt and demoralized. Already they are among the major beneficiaries of the Sukarno regime, and at the same time need not consider themselves fully responsible for the situation. If in the next few years they do not become totally discredited in the eyes of the people and incapable of action, another infinitely more disturbing possibility may arise. At present the officer corps is by and large hostile to the PKI and gives itself the mission of containing communism. If full responsibility for the fate of the country were forced upon them now, they would move instinctively against the PKI. If the present situation continues and the military are forced by President Sukarno to work with the PKI at various levels of government, it is not inconceivable that the officer corps will be affected, like the rest of the country, by the carefully nurtured image of the Communist Party as the last hope for a strong government.

It would be dangerous to overestimate the officers' inflexibility. In 1950 General Nasution, himself, seemed to favor an alignment with the West, but in recent years he has adopted a neutralist posture. He challenged Sukarno on October 17, 1952, but has co-operated with him since 1955. He was reappointed Chief of Staff by Prime Minister B. Harahap, a leader of the Masjumi (Moslem) Party who has since joined the Sumatra rebels, but recently he has tolerated the destruction of that party. None of his friendships among the senior officers seems to have been stable. His recent mission to Moscow was, to say the least, disturbing.

Much depends, of course, on whether the Army's image of the PKI as a tool of Moscow is maintained, or whether the officers will be sold on the Party's "nationalist" motivations. In view of Khrushchev's imaginative use of ideology to further his objectives, the latter possibility should not be excluded. He may yet help the PKI complete the process of achieving respectability. The officer corps, being essentially a radical nationalist (anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist) group in outlook, the likelihood of an ultimate alliance between it and the PKI will increase the longer President Sukarno continues to use his authority to give national respectability to the PKI and to force the officer corps to co-operate with it.

There is probably no immediate danger of a communist coup in Indonesia. The likelihood of an ultimate victory for communism, however, appears greater than ever. The danger will continue as long as the Indonesian political elites, especially the officer corps, become increasingly accustomed to the presence of PKI

members in the government and tend toward the conclusion that the Communist Party alone is able to give the country strong and purposeful government and to obtain from outside the kind and amount of aid necessary for the nation's stabilization and development.

The most recent effort to aid the communist tactics sketched above can be found in the statement by the leaders of 81 communist parties released on December 6, 1960, in Moscow, which accepted "independent national democracy" as a legitimate intermediate form of state:

> In the present historical situation, favorable domestic and international conditions arise in many countries for the establishment of an independent national democracy; that is, a state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory, a state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital, a state which rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government, a state in which the people are insured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, establishment of political parties and social organizations), the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and other democratic and social changes, and for participation in shaping government policy.
>
> The formation and consolidation of national democracies enables the countries concerned to make rapid social progress and play an active part in the peoples' struggle for peace, against the aggressive policies of the imperialist camp, for the complete abolition of colonial yoke.
>
> The Communist parties are working actively for a consistent completion of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution, for the establishment of national democracies, for a radical improvement in the living standard of the people.
>
> They support those actions of national governments leading to the consolidation of the gains achieved and undermining the imperialist positions. . .[3]

With the possible exception of Cuba, the characteristics of what communist doctrine now calls "independent national democracy" apply to no country with greater closeness of fit than to President Sukarno's regime in Indonesia. This situation makes it possible for the PKI and for the Soviet Union to justify their support for the present regime and, ipso facto, to continue their current tactics, which should lead, eventually, to the establishment of a communist regime not by coup d'état but by acclamation.

NOTES

1. Walter Lippmann, The Communist World and Ours, Boston, 1958, pp. 24-25.

2. See my "General Nasution's Mission to Moscow," Asian Survey, March 1961.

3. New York Times, December 7, 1960.

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NAGALAND--INDIA'S SIXTEENTH STATE

B. G. Gokhale

IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR a new state--Nagaland--was added to the map of India. Embracing an area of some 6,350 sq. miles and a population of more than 210,000, it comprises the former Naga Hills-Tuensang area (25° 13'—26° 32' north latitude and 93°—94° 13" east longitude). Its formation marked the culmination of a process that began in 1950 when a section of the Naga tribes rose in rebellion and, in the next year, demanded the establishment of a sovereign Naga state outside the Indian Union.

A major Indian problem in past decades has been posed by the tribal population of the country. More than 22 million Indian citizens belong to a number of scattered tribes. These tribes are, in many cases, distinct ethnic-cultural groups whose way of life is markedly different from that of their non-tribal neighbors. Most of them inhabit densely forested mountain areas and gain their subsistence by hunting and food-gathering, although some also practice cultivation of the slash-and-burn variety. A few tribes have adopted settled agriculture and are rapidly becoming assimilated to the general Indian cultural pattern.

By and large the problem of the tribes is that of a people at a transitional stage whose relative backwardness exposes them to economic exploitation and who therefore require special protection from the state and Union governments. The central government has accordingly sought to ease the strains of transition by giving the tribal peoples economic protection and special advantages in education and by reserving seats for their representatives in the state and Union legislatures. In the main this policy has been effective in averting unrest in the major areas of tribal concentration, although there have, to be sure, been occasional flare-ups, the most recent being the deposition of the Maharaja of Bastar in Madhya Pradesh. These eruptions, however, have been minor in comparison with the uprising of the Naga tribes on the northeastern frontier.

Until they rose in revolt against the Indian government, the Nagas had rarely appeared in the headlines of the national or regional press. They are divided into a number of separate tribes that differ among themselves in matters of economy and social organization. They inhabit a mountainous borderland between the Nowgong district of Assam and the state of Manipur, a wilderness in which turbulent streams become large rivers during the monsoon rains. The Naga Hills did not come under British administration until late in the last century. Subsequently, during the operations

against the Kukis of Manipur in 1917-19, the boundary of the area was extended as far as Burma north of Manipur to embrace the territory called the Naga Tribal Area, renamed the Tuensang Frontier Division.

Other than the occasional British civil servant, the only outsiders with whom the Nagas came into contact in the early years were Christian missionaries who not only proselyted among the various tribes but also concerned themselves with social welfare--activities which led to the rise of an element that subsequently played a prominent part in the Naga nationalist movement. The British administration left the Nagas undisturbed except when they had to be restrained from over-indulging in head-hunting.[1]

With the coming of World War II, the Naga area was overrun by Japanese forces, a development that led the British to make extensive contacts with the Nagas, training them in guerrilla fighting, at which they proved adept. The defeated Japanese left behind numerous caches of arms and ammunition, which the Nagas added to the considerable quantities they had received from the British.

The advent of Indian independence led one group of tribal leaders to demand Naga independence. At the time the Indian government was too preoccupied with the gigantic problems created by the partition of the subcontinent to give much attention to Naga affairs. In 1949-50, however, the northeastern frontier, long dormant, stirred as the communists took over China and, a year later, occupied Tibet. In the spring of 1951 certain Nagas led by one Angami Zapu Phizo demanded complete independence for their people on grounds that their area had never been part of India and that they were culturally quite distinct from India.

Although the Nagas are not a single, homogeneous people, the better educated elements do possess a sense of kinship as members of a single Naga-complex, and it was this feeling of community that Phizo, the leader of the dissident elements, sought to invoke in his bid for the creation of a sovereign Naga state. When this demand met with a firm rejection by the Indian government in May 1951, the extremists resorted to arms.

Their activities took the form of ambushes and raids against government outposts and those sectors favoring a more moderate course. On its side, while recognizing its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, the central government concerned itself also with the social welfare of the tribespeople. Beginning in 1956 it spent considerable sums on welfare activities in the Naga Hills-Tuensang area, where it established numerous schools at various levels and between 1957 and 1960 increased the number of hospitals from 12 to 24. At the same time it sought to encourage moderate Naga leaders to assume political responsibility and to participate in discussions leading to a solution of the problem.

IN OCTOBER 1959, at Mokokchung in the Naga Hills, a Naga People's Convention met in a momentous session under the chairmanship of

Dr. Inkongliba Ao, who believed that the difficulties with the central government could be resolved by negotiation more satisfactori than by warfare. The meeting was attended by some 3,000 persons representing all of the Naga tribes and reflecting diverse shades c opinion. The discussions indicated that the tribes were concerned lest their land be overrun by people from the plains who might exploit it economically without reference to the needs or wishes of the Nagas themselves, and also that, if the existing political administration were perpetuated, they would eventually lose their dis tinct political and cultural identity. The deliberations culminate in the preparation of a draft of desiderata for discussion with the central government.

Among other things, the Convention repudiated the demand for a sovereign and independent Naga state, urging instead the creation c a distinct Naga entity within the Indian Union. It also proposed that the new state be placed under the jurisdiction of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and that a Chief Secretary bear speci responsibility for the maintenance of law and order until the forma establishment of the state, when the Indian president should appoi the governor.

The Convention recommended that, if the local populations agreed, the new state should comprise the contiguous Naga areas of Assam, Manipur, the North East Frontier Area, and the Naga Hills-Tuensang area. The governor would be advised by a council elected from a legislative assembly representing all of the tribes; this council would include both elected and appointed ministers responsible to the legislature. In the interim period an advisory board representing the more important Naga tribes would be constituted t replace the existing authority and to organize the elections to th Assembly and tribal councils.

The Convention went on to recommend that the new state should have two representatives in the Indian Lok Sabha (House of the Peo ple, with 500 members in all) and one in the Raj Sabha (Council of States, with 250 members).[2] Acts of the Indian Parliament affecting the Nagas would become operative only after ratification by th Naga legislative assembly. Local government would remain the prov ince of the tribal and village councils. Each tribe would have it own court; ultimate authority would lie with the Supreme Court of India. The Convention requested that, as long as the new state remained unable to support itself, the central government should ensure its financial viability by means of subventions. The Convention also demanded the return to the Nagas of the reserve forests in Assam and the establishment of a separate Naga regiment within the Indian army. Finally, it asked for the release of all Naga rebels held captive by the government, the declaration of the stat as a "protected area" on the ground that most of its inhabitants are tribespeople, and the acknowledgment of the Nagas' right to draft their own constitution.

The Mokokchung Convention represented the first constructive approach on the Naga side toward a solution of the problem posed

by the political future of the Naga tribes.

The deliberations of the Naga People's Convention having elicited a sympathetic response from the central government, a delegation of 15 leaders under Dr. Ao met with Prime Minister Nehru and other Indian government personalities in New Delhi in July 1960. Their conversations produced a new agreement which committed the central government to create a new state, called Nagaland and comprising the existing Naga Hills-Tuensang area, within the Indian Union. Under its terms the governor of Assam would become the governor of the new state as well, and the Assam High Court would continue to exercise jurisdiction in Nagaland. The agreement set up an interim advisory body for the transitional period, but left the governor with special responsibility for law and order as long as rebel activity might continue. The central government undertook to assure the fiscal and financial soundness of the new state. A legislative assembly and a council of ministers would be formed, with adequate safeguards for Naga religious, social and economic interests. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs would be the New Delhi point of reference on matters relating to the new state, and a special customs administration would be set up for the Tuensang area in view of its position on the Indo-Burma border.

The acceptance at the July parleys of most of the Convention's demands was expected to lead to the cessation of hostile tribal activity. In the event, however, while Naga supporters of the People's Convention busied themselves enthusiastically with electing representatives to the proposed assembly and tribal councils, Phizo's rebels remained unreconciled and have continued their attacks. Their strength lies not only in the size of the armed bands at their disposal--thought to number about 1,500 men--but quite as much in the "neutrality" displayed by segments of the Naga population without whose tacit support rebel activity would be impossible. Competent observers have estimated that the Phizo forces enjoy the active support of some 10 to 20 per cent of the tribal population, that perhaps 40 per cent actively support the Convention, and that the remainder are "neutral." The central government's undertaking to create a separate Naga state has been a challenge to the Convention to win over the "neutrals" by convincing them that the agreement is the best obtainable insofar as the long-term welfare of the Nagas is concerned.[3]

THE CONTINUATION of hostilities has not halted progress on the constitutional settlement of the Naga problem. In January of this year President Rajendra Prasad of India promulgated a series of transitional measures relating to the administration of Nagaland, which was formally established in March. These measures follow the lines laid down in the July 1960 agreement, so that the way is now clear for the future development of this sixteenth state of the Indian Union.

Although Nagaland will have equal status with other units of the Union, it will be accorded certain special privileges. Because

its economy is one of the most backward in the nation, it will need prolonged and extensive federal assistance, particularly in the improvement of communications, which is desirable both in itself and as a means of pacifying the region. The new state will also require federal assistance in developing its political administration and educational facilities. As a strategic frontier area, Nagaland will continue to be a special concern of the Ministries of External Affairs and of Defence.

The creation of the new state assures the Nagas of an opportunity to develop in their own way and without violent disturbance to their cultural life, although the transitional period is bound to bring with it numerous problems of adjustment. The handling of these problems will call for vision and skill on the part of the Naga leaders; the success of the new state will depend largely on the degree of confidence that they can inspire among all of the Naga tribes. Since his outburst in London last summer, Phizo has been quiescent, and it is reasonable to assume that, despite his denunciation of the Convention leaders as Indian puppets, their ability to obtain a much more favorable political settlement from the Indian government than anything he can show will reduce his influence in several tribal sectors. He continues to seek international support for his objective a sovereign Nagaland, but thus far to no purpose.

NOTES

1. This activity is still practiced occasionally. Thus, in November of last year Naga head-hunters from the Tuensang district raided a Makware village in Burma and carried off 14 heads, reportedly in retaliation for the Makware having earlier taken nine Naga heads.

2. The Naga areas had been assigned seats in both the Lok Sabha and the Assam Legislative Assembly under the 1950 Indian Constitution, but the Nagas had refused to elect representatives to fill these seats, which were left vacant in the subsequent general elections.

3. Early in 1960 Phizo fled from the Naga area, reportedly via East Pakistan, and eventually made his way to London, where he issued public statements charging the Indian army and police with mistreatment of Naga tribespeople. His allegations were later denied by government spokesmen in the Indian Parliament.

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